

Message Text

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NRC-05 OES-03 MC-02 /098 W
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R 081340Z AUG 75
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3059
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 4254

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: OPTION III: TEXT OF DRAFT GUIDANCE

REF: A) USNATO 3970 DTG 291355Z JUL 75; B) ISNATO 3985 DTG
291832Z JUL 75

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE FULL TEXT OF SPC DRAFT GUIDANCE ON
OPTION III AS IT EMERGED FROM AUGUST 7 SPC MEETING. PREVIOUS
VERSION OF THIS TEXT WAS TRANSMITTED BY REFS A AND B, WHICH
EXPLAINED ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE AND BRACKETS IN THAT EARLIER TEXT.
THIS COMMENTARY EXPLAINS CHANGES FROM THE EARLIER TEXT.

2. THE BRACKETED LANGUAGE IN THE SECOND AND THIRD TICS OF PARA 1
("TO THE US" AND "TO THE USSR") IS THE FRG PROPOSAL. THE
UNBRACKETED NEW SECOND CHAPEAU IN PARA 1 REFLECTS SPC AGREEMENT
ON BELGIAN COMPROMISE LANGUAGE.

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3. THE FIRST SENTENCE IN PARA 3 DROPS THE PHRASE "AS
REGARDS TACTICS" IN DEFERENCE TO BELGIAN VIEW THAT THIS IS
MORE STRATEGY THAN TACTICS AND PUTS "AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE"
IN BRACKETS, PER BELGIAN REQUEST, SINCE BELGIAN DOES NOT

WISH TO PUT FORTH NUMBERS UNTIL OTHER SIDE HAS AGREED ON PRINCIPLE. BELGIUM IS ONLY COUNTRY TO UPHOLD THIS VIEW. BELGIUM HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT DOES WANT TO PUT ALL ELEMENTS FORTH SIMULTANEOUSLY, ALTHOUGH WITHOUT NUMBERS, AND NOT SERIATIM. ITALY, WHICH IS ONLY COUNTRY TO HAVE STATED PREFERENCE FOR SERIATIM APPROACH, HAS NOT REQUESTED BRACKETS AROUND "SIMULTANEOUSLY".

4. THE "PLUS" ADD-ON TO PARA 3 NOW CONTAINS THE BRACKETED DUTCH LANGUAGE "IN EXCHANGE FOR WESTERN PHASE I OBJECTIVES". FRG HAD BEEN THE ONLY COUNTRY TO SUPPORT THE PLUS PARAGRAPH. NETHERLANDS CAN NOW ACCEPT EITHER THE PLUS PARA, OR PARA 3(BIS) OF THE SUPPLEMENT, IF IT CONTAINS THE PHRASE "IN EXCHANGE FOR WESTERN PHASE I OBJECTIVES".

5. THE "EITHER" VERSION OF PARAS 4 AND 5 ARE US LANGUAGE BRACKETED BY BELGIUM. THE "PLUS EITHER" VERSION OF THE LAST TIC OF PARA 5. AND PARAS 6 TO 8 ARE US LANGUAGE (EXCEPT THAT LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 8 IS OF UK ORIGIN). THE "OR" VERSION OF THE LAST TIC OF PARA 5 AND PARAS 6-7 IS THE FRG ALTERNATIVE TO THE US "PLUS EITHER" LANGUAGE. THE "PLUS" VERSION OF PARAS (9) (8) IS US LANGUAGE BRACKETED BY BELGIUM. THE CONCLUDING "OR" SECTION IS THE BELGIAN LANGUAGE ON CEILINGS.

6. PARA 7 IN THE US "PLUS EITHER" SECTION DRG DROPS THE BRACKETED UK PHRASES, PER UK AGREEMENT, AND PARA 8 CONTAINS NEW US LANGUAGE.

7 BEGIN SPC DRAFT GUIDANCE:

MBFR: DRAFT GUIDANCE ON INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS

1. IN THEIR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS PRESENTED ON 22 NOVEMBER, 1973, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ALLIES PROPOSED, INTER ALIA, THAT, IN PHASE I THERE SHOULD BE REDUCTIONS OF A US AND SOVIET FORCES AND A COMMITMENT BY BOTH SIDES AS TO THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
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TO BE REACHED IN PHASE II. SPECIFICALLY, THE ALLIES HAVE PROPOSED THAT(1):

- BOTH SIDES SHOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT AS THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING, APPROPRIATELY DEFINED IN PHASE I, ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TO BE COMPLETED IN PHASE II. THIS COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING (MIGHT) (WOULD) BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 70,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE;

- THE UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS

(TO THE UNITED STATES) 29,000 US SOLDIERS;

- TH SOVIET UNION WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS
(TO THE USSR) A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF 5 DIVISIONS INCLUDING
SOME 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

FOOTNOTE:

(1) THE WORDING OF THE FINAL SENTENCE OF THIS LEAD-IN WOULD
HAVE TO BE REVIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE LANGUAGE ULTIMATELY
ACCEPTED IN THE BRACKETED AREAS OF THE THREE "TICKS"
WHICH IMMEDIATELY FOLLOW.

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THE ALLIES ARE NOW OFFERING THE FOLLIWING ON CONDITION THAT ALL
THE FOREGOING GOALS WILL BE AGREED IN PHASE I OF THE NEGOTIATIONS:

- THE UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW AS A ONE-TIME COMPLEMENT
TO THE WESTERN REDUCTION CONTRIBUTION A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION
OF ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN CENTRAL ERUOPE, NAMELY 1,000 US
NUCLEAR WARHEADS, 54 US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT AND
36 US PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS;

(- THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING WOULD BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE
AIR MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, RESULTING IN A COMMON
COLLECTIVE CEILING WHICH (MIGH) (WOULD) BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY

900,000 MEN.)

2. IN PUTTING FORWARD THIS PROPOSAL, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION PREVIOUSLY PUT FORWARD TO THE EAST REMAIN UNCHANGED.

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3. THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD (, AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE) PUT FORWARD ALL THE PROPOSALS IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE SEPARATED. IN MAKING THEIR PRESENTATION, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD STRESS THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS MOVE AND REQUEST THAT THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS GIVE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE. THEY SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THESE PROPOSALS ARE BEING PUT FORWARD AS A ONE-TIME OFFER TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS. THE ALLIES SHOULD RESTATE THEIR POSITION THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON GROUND FORCE (S) (MANPOWER), WHICH CONSTITUTE(S) THE LARGEST AND MOST SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ELEMENT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD ADDRESS THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS AS THE MAJOR DESTABILISING FACTORS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THOUGH THE NEW ALLIED MOVE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE EASTERN SIDE ABOUT NUCLEAR AND AIR ELEMENTS, IT CONSTITUTES A UNIQUE (TRADE) (OFFER) AND IS NOT A STEP TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT.

PLUS

(THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS, IF AND WHEN PRESSED, SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE EASTERN SIDE THAT THIS OFFER IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS FINAL, IN THE SENSE THAT NO OTHER OFFER FOR THE REDUCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OF ANY KIND CAN BE HOPED FOR IN EITHER PHASE I OR PHASE II FROM EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANT (IN EXCHANGE FOR WESTERN PHASE I OBJECTIVES).)

4. IN THEIR INITIAL PRESENTATIONS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD AVOID DISCUSSING THE ISSUES OF WHAT ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED AND THE NATURE OF SUCH LIMITATION.

EITHER

(IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM EASTERN NEGOTIATORS AS TO WHETHER REDUCTIONS OF ARMAMENTS ENTAIL LIMITATIONS ON ARMAMENTS REDUCED, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SUCH MATTERS AFTER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REDUCTIONS HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY EXPLORED.

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5. SUBSEQUENTLY IF THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS, HAVING PROVIDED AN INSTRUCTED RESPONSE, PRESS FOR DETAILS AND IF, IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS, THE RESPONSE SHOWS SERIOUS EASTERN INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT INCORPORATING THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES MAY BE OUTLINED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING LIMITATIONS:

- THE US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN LIMITATIONS ON US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, US SURFACE-TO SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES OF OVER 500 KILOMETER RANGE, AND US AIRCRAFT OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS;

- THE NUMBER OF EACH OF THESE US ELEMENTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS COULD NOT EXCEED THE NUMBER IN THE AREA FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS, WITH SUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO PERMIT NORMAL TRAINING AND EXERCISES;

PLUS EITHER

- (- THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT INCREASE THEIR NUCLEAR ELEMENTS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE WITHDRAWN BY THE US (IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT).

6. IF THE EAST ASKS FOR LIMITS ON ALLIED NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT LIMITS ON ALLIED NUCLEAR ELEMENTS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST (; THE PREVIOUSLY OFFERED ALLIED NO-INCREASE COMMITMENTS ON AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER OFFER ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT THE PROPOSED PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED).

7. AS PART OF THE DISCUSSION OF ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE NUMBER REMAINING AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

8. IF THE EAST ASKS IF LIMITS WOULD BE IMPOSED ON US TANKS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER, - 004904-853, THAT SOME CONSTRAINING ON THE LEVEL OF US MAIN BATTLE TANKS - IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT US TANKS WOULD NOT BE INCREASED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT - COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST AS PART OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT. IT
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SHOULD ALSO BE MADE CLEAR AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME THAT, BEFORE ACCEPTING SUCH LIMITATIONS, THE AGREEMENT MUST ALLOW FOR RESTORATION OF TANK STOCKS TO EARLIER LEVELS. EASTERN DEMANDS FOR EXPLICIT LIMITATIONS ON NON-US ALLIED TANKS SHOULD BE FIRMLY RESISTED.)

OR

(- LIKEWISE, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS COULD NOT EXCEED THE NUMBER IN THE AREA FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS WITH SUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO PERMIT NORMAL TRAINING AND EXERCISES, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE ALLIED POSITION.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3061
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INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA
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6. IF THE EAST ASKS IF LIMITS WOULD BE IMPOSED ON US TANKS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ASK THE EAST IN RETURN IF THE SOVIETS WOULD ACCEPT LIMITS ON THEIR NUCLEAR ELEMENTS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE WITHDRAWN BY THE US. IF THE EAST REPLIES POSITIVELY TO THAT QUESTION, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD INDICATE THAT SOME CONSTRAINT ON THE LEVEL OF US TANKS COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST AS PART OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT. IT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE CLEAR AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME THAT, BEFORE ACCEPTING SUCH LIMITATIONS, THE AGREEMENT MUST ALLOW FOR RESTORATION OF TANK STOCKS TO EARLIER LEVELS.

7. IF THE EAST ASKS FOR LIMITS ON ALLIED NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND ALLIED MAIN BATTLE TANKS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT LIMITS ON ALLIED NUCLEAR ELEMENTS AND ALLIED MAIN BATTLE TANKS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST (; THE PREVIOUSLY OFFERED ALLIED NO-INCREASE COMMITMENTS ON AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER OFFER ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT THE PROPOSED PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED).)

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PLUS

(9)(8). IF THE EAST SEEKS STILL FURTHER DETAILS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT, CLEARLY, FURTHER DETAILS WOULD NEED TO BE AGREED; E.G. ON WHICH US AIRCRAFT MODELS AND SOVIET TANK MODELS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMIT; (ON THE FORM OF THE RECIPROCAL PROVISION AFFECTING SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS.) ON EXCEPTIONS FOR TRAINING AND EXERCISES, ETC.)

OR

(ALTERNATIVE TO EVERYTHING FOLLOWING FIRST (EITHER"ABOVE)

(AS A RULE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAINTAIN THE POSITION THAT THE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN THE WESTERN PROPOSALS REGARDING GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER SURRICE TO ENSURE IN PRACTICE ADEQUATE CONSTRAINTS ON QUANTITATIVE INCREASES OF EQUIPMENTS.

5. IF THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES ARGUE THAT THE REDUCTION OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IS OF NO VALUE UNLESS THEIR SUBSEQUENT REINTRODUCTION INTO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IS RULED OUT, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD READILY AGREE THAT THIS IS SELF-EVIDENT. AT THE SAME TIME THEY SHOULD STATE THAT NON-REINFTRDUCTION DOES NOT, HOWEVER, NEED TO BE ENSURED BY MEANS OF EXPLICIT CEILINGS ON THE RESUDUAL LEVELS, SINCE THIS PARTICULAR REDUCTION REPRESENTS A SPECIFIC AND UNIQUE COMPLEMENT TO THE MAIN, GENERALLY APPLIED, REDUCTION MEASURE LEADING TO APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

6. THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAINTAIN, AS APPROPRIATE, THE POSITION THAT AN EXPLICIT CEILING SHOULD BE PUT ON THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, SINCE THE WITHDRAWAL OF APPROXIMATELY 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS INTHE SOVIET TANK ARMY WITHDRAWN IN PHASE I IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF A GENERALLY APPLIED MEASURE AIMED AT ESTTABLISHING APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

7. THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD REFRAIN FROM FURTHER MOVES IN THOSE MATTERS PENDING POSSIBLE NEW GUIDANCE FROM THE
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COUNCIL. THEY SHOULD AVOID AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BEING DRAWN INTO A DEBATE ON RECIPROCITY REGARDING SAID MATTERS.

8. IF THE EAST ASKS FOR LIMITS ON ALLIED NON-US EQUIPMENTS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT SUCH LIMITS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST MAINLY IN VIEW OF THE DISPARITIES WHICH EXIST IN FAVOUR OF THE EAST(; THE PREVIOUSLY

OFFERED ALLIED NO-INCREASE COMMITMENTS ON GROUND AND AIR
MANPOWER OFFER ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT THE PROPOSED PHASE I
AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED AS REGARDS EQUIPMENTS).)

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